Mont. Code Ann. § 13-1-112 (2) VOTE (Voice of the Ex-Offender) is a grassroots, membership-based organization in Louisiana that works to protect and expand civic engagement and voting rights of the people most critically impacted by the criminal justice system, especially formerly incarcerated persons, their families and loved ones. Some of VOTE's work includes voter registration drives that ensure that formerly incarcerated people register to vote once they are eligible and become active participants in democracy and criminal justice reform. VOTE was also one of the leading organizations in the Make City Council Work For Us Campaign, which aimed to ensure that the New Orleans City Council truly represented the city of New Orleans and not just particular neighborhoods and interests by changing the city charter to create an appropriate number of council districts. VOTE has also campaigned to end prison gerrymandering.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Amici long have been concerned with the injustices that flow from the manner in which the Census Bureau currently tabulates incarcerated persons in the U.S. Census, and the resulting impact on redistricting -problems that have come to be known as "prison gerrymandering." Although the case before this Court does not directly address the constitutionality of prison gerrymandering, Appellants nonetheless have suggested that their argument for removing non-voting individuals from the population base used for redistricting somehow is buttressed by the effort to reform prison gerrymandering. See Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 8.
Appellants' suggestion is flatly incorrect. Indeed, amici and many other groups that oppose prison gerrymandering also strongly oppose Appellants' effort to require states to limit the population base to voters. Accordingly, amici submit this brief in order to clear away potential confusion and explain how the issue of prison gerrymandering does and does not relate to the issues before the Court in this case.
Section I of the brief describes the problem of prison gerrymandering and outlines its factual and legal context. Specifically, it explains why treating incarcerated persons as "residents" of the prison where they are involuntarily detained, instead of their home communities, creates serious inaccuracies and distorts redistricting, whether or not the incarcerated persons are eligible to vote.
Section II explains why the rule proposed by Appellants -that only voters be included in the population base for redistricting -would not cure the problem of prison gerrymandering. Most importantly, the problems stemming from the miscount of incarcerated persons are the result of where they are counted for redistricting purposes -not whether they are counted. Creating a constitutional requirement to exclude non-voting populations from the population base used for redistricting would not correct the distortions that flow from the miscount of incarcerated persons, and in fact could exacerbate those distortions.
Finally, Section III explains that the problem of prison gerrymandering may implicate Equal Protection concerns for reasons entirely distinct from the arguments advanced by Appellants. Appellants contend that the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires the Court to enshrine the goal of electoral equality above the goal of representational equality. The constitutional arguments against prison gerrymandering, by contrast, require no judicial choice between the goals of electoral equality and representational equality, because prison gerrymandering cannot be justified by either theory of representation. Accordingly, to the extent they invoke the problem of prison gerrymandering as supporting their chosen Fourteenth Amendment theory, Appellants are relying on a false parallel.
INCARCERATED PERSONS ARE MIS-COUNTED IN THE U.S. CENSUS, RESULT-ING IN PRISON GERRYMANDERING.
In conducting its decennial population count, the U.S. Census Bureau tabulates incarcerated persons as "residents" of the prison where they are involuntarily imprisoned. States and localities that use this Census Bureau data for redistricting purposes are counting incarcerated people in the wrong place -a practice commonly referred to as "prison gerrymandering." This practice results in serious population distortions in redistricting, and fails to reflect accurately the demographics of numerous communities throughout our country.
The problem flows from the Bureau's application of its "usual residence" rule, which defines an individual's residence as "the place where the individual lives and sleeps most of the time," 2 regardless of other factors relevant to determining actual residence. Because of this outdated rule and its flawed application in redistricting, some two million incarcerated people are being counted in the wrong place in the U.S. Census.
The nature of confinement at a prison strongly contradicts the notion that a prison is a "residence" in any normal sense of the word. Individuals confined at a prison are barred from interaction with neighbors and members of the community with which the Census Bureau combines them as "residents." They cannot visit local churches, schools or theaters, or patronize local businesses such as restaurants, grocery stores, gas stations and clothing stores. They cannot make use of parks, playgrounds, or public transportation, nor can they attend civic events in the community.
Even the children of incarcerated persons are often denied basic community services open to all other children whose parents actually reside in the community. For example, although Cranston, Rhode Island counts the population of the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI) as "residents" of the city ward where the prison is located when apportioning ward districts, a parent incarcerated at the ACI is not allowed to claim residency there to have his child educated in Cranston public schools.
3 The incarcerated parent is a "resident" only for purposes of padding the population base of the ward containing the prison, but not for any other purpose.
Similarly, incarcerated persons typically are barred from claiming residence at the prison location for other purposes, such as filing for divorce 4 or claiming diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts. compound its impact when states and localities draw legislative districts.
Analysis of 2010 Census data shows that Blacks are incarcerated at five times the rate of nonHispanic Whites, and Latinos (including Hispanics) are incarcerated at a rate almost two times higher than non-Hispanic Whites.
9 These disparate rates of incarceration are combined with the enduring and troubling trend of building the prisons in communities that are very different demographically from the communities of people confined in the prisons.
10 When states and localities use these data for redistricting, it results in prison-gerrymandered districts, where Black and Latino incarcerated people are used to pad out districts to the benefit of predominantly White residents. It would be in keeping with the bulk of the Census Bureau's representational logic to tally incarcerated individuals in the communities to which they are most closely connected on Census Day. That location is not where they are involuntarily confined, but rather where their relatives and friends and support systems are often located, where their children may live, where they are most likely to return when they are released from incarceration, and where their inclusion will illuminate and not distort the snapshot of the true local community. Two states -Maryland and New York -have already responded to the distortions caused by prison gerrymandering by enacting legislation requiring that incarcerated persons be counted as residents of their home communities rather than of the prison for purposes of redistricting -legislation that was in effect for the 2010 redistricting process.
14 Two more states have enacted similar legislation that will go into effect for the 2020 Census.
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For all these reasons, amici and many others have called on the Census Bureau to change its practices so as to tabulate incarcerated persons at their home residence instead of at the prison where they are involuntarily and temporarily detained. As explained below, however, this reform effort in no way supports Appellants' Fourteenth Amendment claims in this case.
II. THE GOAL OF REFORMING PRISON GERRYMANDERING IS ENTIRELY DIS-TINCT FROM APPELLANTS' MISGUIDED GOAL OF EQUALIZING ELIGIBLE VOT-ING POPULATION AMONG DISTRICTS.
As noted above, Appellants have sought to bolster their arguments by suggesting that the goal of reforming prison gerrymandering somehow supports their argument for equalizing eligible voting population among districts. See Opp. to Mot. to Dismiss or Affirm 8. While the Bureau's current practices regarding tabulation of incarcerated populations can result in representational inequality, this is only because the incarcerated persons are being counted in the wrong place by states and localities when drawing district lines. The ultimate goal of reforming prison gerrymandering is not to eliminate incarcerated persons from the population count, but instead is to ensure that incarcerated persons are tabulated at the correct location -the home communities where their relatives and support systems exist and to which they will typically return on release from incarceration.
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The goal of Appellants' lawsuit is very different: it seeks to exclude non-citizens (and presumably other non-voters) entirely from the population count used in redistricting, even though non-citizens typically have ties with the location where they are counted that far exceed the ties of incarcerated persons to the prison location. For example, unlike incarcerated persons who are counted in the prison location, non-U.S. citizens are counted in communities where they have strong actual ties to other members of the community. Indeed, they often reside and are counted in households that include family members who are U.S. citizens.
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Unlike incarcerated persons, noncitizens and other non-voters are able to participate in the economic and civic life of the community where they are counted -they shop at grocery and clothing stores, gas stations and other establishments; attend religious services and support religious establishments; work and pay taxes in the community; and engage in civic and volunteer activities. None of these avenues for community engagement are available to the incarcerated persons who are counted as residents of the prison where they are housed.
Thus, Appellants' proposal that districts should be apportioned by equalizing the number of eligible voters in the population base would not alleviate the problem of prison gerrymandering. Consider the examples of Maine and Vermont, where incarcerated persons remain eligible to vote, but must vote absentee ballots in their home communities rather than in 17 See Joanna Dreby, Ctr. for Am. Progress, How Today's Immigration Enforcement Policies Impact Children, Families, and Communities 1 (2012), available at https://www.americanprogress. org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/DrebyImmigrationFamilies_exec summ.pdf. the location where they are incarcerated.
18 Under Appellants' approach, incarcerated persons in Maine and Vermont would be included in the population base of the prison community for redistricting purposes because they are included in the Census Bureau's population tally, and they are eligible to vote. But they would not be included in the population base for redistricting in the home communities where they actually cast their ballots, because the Census Bureau does not include them in the population count in their home communities. Appellants' rule of electoral equality using Census Bureau data would thus result in a nonsensical attribution of incarcerated populations to communities where they cannot vote, while excluding them from the population count in the communities in which they actually do vote.
In contrast to Maine and Vermont, many states deny the franchise to persons serving sentences for conviction of a felony, and in these states, Appellants' proposed rule also fails to solve the problem of prison gerrymandering. An example of prison gerrymandering in Cranston, Rhode Island illustrates this point, and shows the difficulty of distinguishing voting from non-voting populations among incarcerated populations in Census data.
In Rhode Island, the sole state-run facility for adult incarcerated population is the Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), located in Ward Six in the city of Cranston. The Census Bureau counts this population as "residents" of Cranston, and Cranston in turn has assigned this population entirely to Ward Six for purposes of drawing City Council and School Committee districts. Many incarcerated persons at the ACI remain eligible to vote because they are either awaiting trial or were sentenced on misdemeanors rather than felonies; but as with the voting-eligible incarcerated persons in Maine and Vermont, these individuals are required to vote absentee from their home communities, which are overwhelmingly located outside Ward Six of the City of Cranston.
19 Census data, however, do not distinguish between pre-trial and sentenced populations, and thus do not distinguish between voting-eligible and non-eligible incarcerated persons. Accordingly, to the extent Appellants seek to rely on voting-eligible population as the basis for drawing electoral districts, this would be completely unworkable in a setting such as the ACI in Cranston, where the pre-trial and sentenced populations are indistinguishable in the Census data.
All of this illuminates a core fact: the goal of reforming prison gerrymandering is not at all comparable to Appellants' goal of entirely excluding non-voters from the population base. The goal of reforming prison gerrymandering seeks to count incarcerated persons properly as residents of their home communities, not to completely exclude non-voters from the population base.
20 Accordingly, Appellants cannot support their arguments by relying on false analogies between prison gerrymandering reform and their improper goal of entirely excluding non-voters from the redistricting calculus. 20 In counting incarcerated people at the location of the prison, the Census Bureau makes two distinct errors that affect redistricting: 1) it fails to count incarcerated people where they reside, and 2) it counts incarcerated people at the location of the facility. A city or county has the power only to correct the second part of the Bureau's miscount -assigning people to the wrong location -and not the first part -failing to assign them to the correct location. Accordingly, some local redistricting authorities adjust population data, to the extent their jurisdiction permits, by removing incarcerated people from the population base for redistricting, because the Census Bureau incorrectly counted them as if they were residents of that location. Appellants contend that the Fourteenth Amendment requires the Court to choose between two competing theories of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment -electoral equality and representational equality -and to invalidate a state's choice of representational equality if it conflicts with the goal of electoral equality. Under an electoral theory of equality, the Fourteenth Amendment is argued to protect the rights only of eligible voters and thus to require states to equalize the numbers of voters in each district. 21 Under a representational theory of equality, the Fourteenth Amendment is argued to have a broader scope that protects the rights of all persons, and thus to require states to equalize the numbers of persons in each district -without regard to often temporary or changing circumstances such as whether the person is eligible or registered to vote.
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Amici believe that the arguments for representational equality are much stronger than those for equality based on eligible voters, 23 but do not wish to duplicate the arguments being made by other amici on that score. In this brief, amici seek only to underscore the point that the practice of prison gerrymandering cannot be justified under either theory of representation. Accordingly, the arguments for reforming prison gerrymandering in no way require the Court to embrace Appellants' demand that electoral equality must be the sole touchstone for implementing the Fourteenth Amendment's one-person, onevote requirement.
This point is well explained in Davidson v. City of Cranston. In Davidson, city residents are challenging a redistricting plan for city and school committee districts in Cranston, Rhode Island, which assigns the adult incarcerated population of the ACI in Rhode Island as "residents" of one ward in the City of Cranston. As noted by the district court in denying a motion to dismiss, "the case now before this Court 22 Angeles, 918 F.2d 763, 773-74 (9th Cir. 1990) . 23 All federal appellate courts that have been asked to enshrine electoral equality above representational equality have ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment does not support that demand. Chen v. City of Houston, 206 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2000); Daly v. Hunt, 93 F.3d 1212 (4th Cir. 1996 Garza, 918 F.2d 763. presents an alleged set of circumstances that appears to be justified by neither the principle of electoral equality nor of representational equality." Id. at 331. The court's opinion pointed out that, assuming Plaintiffs' allegations are true, " [c] learly, the inclusion of the ACI prison population is not advancing the principle of electoral equality because the majority of prisoners, pursuant to the State's Constitution, cannot vote, and those who can vote are required by State law to vote by absentee ballot from their preincarceration address." Id. Given the complaint's allegations that the incarcerated persons are unable to interact with elected officials or with the community where they are counted in any meaningful way, the court further noted that "the prisoners' inclusion in Ward Six does nothing to advance the principle of representational equality." Id.
Garza v. County of Los
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The Davidson ruling underscores that solving the problem of prison gerrymandering does not require the federal courts to choose an electoral theory of equality in preference to a representational theory of 24 Surprisingly, one amicus brief supporting Appellants cites the Davidson decision as if it supports an argument requiring a rule of electoral equality in redistricting. Br. of the City of Yakima, Washington as Amicus Curiae Supp. Appellants, at 14 n.19. As the above discussion confirms, this is a complete misreading of the decision, which directly rejects the argument that reforming prison gerrymandering requires a court to choose between electoral equality and representational equality. This no doubt explains why the Appellants do not rely on Davidson as supporting their claims in this case.
equality. Reforming the practice of prison gerrymandering involves resolving the question of where incarcerated persons -whether or not they are eligible to vote -should be counted for purposes of redistricting under either an electoral or representational theory of equality. It certainly does not justify a constitutional rule elevating the goal of electoral equality above that of representational equality. * * *
As noted in the Summary of Argument, amici are well aware that this case does not directly address the rationality or constitutionality of prison gerrymandering. The modest purpose of this brief is simply to explain that Appellants are relying on false parallels to the extent they invoke the problem of prison gerrymandering as supporting their argument for a Fourteenth Amendment rule excluding non-citizens or non-voters from the population base for redistricting.
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